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Introduction
The yearning for greater integration with Central Asia has resulted in the
quest for reinventing the old trade route known as the ‘Great Silk Route’ and
creating a modern-day version of the same – the New Silk Road. The origins of
the Great Silk Road can be traced back to the second half of the second century
BC, when the Chinese diplomat and spy Chjan Tzyan originally introduced his
compatriots to – an unexplored part of the world – Central Asia. The route
existed till the sixteenth century AD, having a total length of about 7,000-km.
The Silk Route was named so, because the first item traded on it was Chinese
silk. Later, other goods such as jewellery, glass and iron were also added to the
list of items.
Off late, there have been multifarious efforts put by the European Union,
United States and China to seriously revive the Great Silk Road.1 A revival of
the Silk Road was first mooted after disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991
by the European Commission, though later, the lead was taken by the U.S.,
which has actively sought assistance from other countries, especially India in
taking its agenda of reviving the Silk Road further. The Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline is a case in point, which is one of
projects taken up to include in the U.S. ‘New Silk Road’ initiative. This initiative
was introduced by the former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on the
side-lines of the UN General Assembly in September 2011.2 While introducing
this initiative she said:
Turkmen gas fields could help meet both Pakistan’s and India’s growing
energy needs and provide significant transit revenues for both Afghanistan and
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Pakistan. Tajik cotton could be turned into Indian linens. Furniture and fruit
from Afghanistan could find its way to the markets of Astana or Mumbai and
beyond.3
But soon the allegory of a “New Silk Road” was picked up by China from
here through Turkmenistan, wherein the beginning of delivery of natural gas
was started from Turkmen gas fields, originally planned to be fulfilled by the
U.S. backed TAPI gas pipeline. With its plan to switch over from dirty fossil
fuels like coal to natural gas and to reap the geographical advantage it had in
Central Asia, China has imported large amounts of gas from this region,
particularly from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh field. China, which received
25 billion cubic meter (BCM) of gas in 2014 has planned to raise this volume
to 65 BCM by 2020.4 So far three pipelines are pumping natural gas from
Turkmenistan to Xinjian while a fourth is under construction.
But interestingly, China’s march towards the New Silk Road has started to
face some challenges too including the need for Turkmenistan to diversify its
exports beyond China and security challenges which China has started to face
on its infrastructure investments in Central Asia on a consistent basis.
Evolution of the New Silk Road
While the origin of the revival of the New Silk Road could be linked to
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, it can actually be traced back to as
early as 1959, when The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and Pacific (UNESCAP) regions initiated a project named Trans-Asian
Railways (TAR) (Figure 1) as a component of The Asian Land Transport
Infrastructure Development (ALTID), which aims to connect New Delhi with
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and extending till Moscow.5 The progress of this
project was stalled during the Cold War and later formalised by the Trans-
Asian Railway Network Agreement, also known as the ‘Iron Silk Road Project’
in 2006.6
The revival of the ancient route, as aforementioned, was again mooted by
the European Commission in 1991, soon after the disintegration of the Russian
Federation. Serious efforts for giving a push to the project began in May 1993
with the Brussels Conference. The proposal to create the Transport Corridor
Europe-Caucasus-Asia7 (TRACECA) was also supported by the United States,
along with the European Union. The member countries then allocated
€15 million towards the trade and transport project. The countries participating
in this project were Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Romania, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan
223
and Ukraine to cover the areas such as maritime transport, aviation, road and
rail transport security and transport infrastructure under its cooperation
framework.8
After the Cold War in 1994, the then Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng,
during a visit to Central Asia declared that, it was important to open up a modern
version of the Silk Road.9 This is considered to be the beginning of the Chinese
version of the ‘Great Silk Road’.
Different Versions of the New Silk Road
The various versions of the New Silk Road or for that matter, the Silk
Road Initiatives, particularly after the post-Soviet Union era, have both economic
and geopolitical implications, not only for the countries, which have initiated
this idea but also for those nations which are/or would be a part of this robust
infrastructural trans-national network.
All these countries stand to substantially gain from the infrastructural
development, from road, rail network, and power lines and even through the
gas pipelines such as TAPI or any other such futuristic energy corridors. These
Source: UNESCAP
Figure 1: Trans Asian Railway Network
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initiatives are expected to give a fillip to the economies of all participating
countries.
Almost all the initiatives connect Central Asia with Eurasia and such
initiatives should be looked through the twin prisms of global geopolitical and
economical strategies of the consensus as opposed to the ‘New Great Game’
idea which is rhetorical to bring in the zero-sum game.
It would be appropriate now to look at the efforts by regional groupings
and countries for the promotion of the New Silk Road, in the aftermath of two
important events – the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 9/11
terror attacks.
The Initiatives Post-Soviet Disintegration
Initiatives of the European Commission: The first serious move for the
revival of the Great Silk Route came from the European Commission in 1991,
when the Commission spoke about its desire to create TRACECA10, primarily
a Central Asian and Caucasus initiative. The project was further discussed at
the Brussels Conference in 1993. Later in 1998, a Basic Multilateral Agreement
(MLA) was signed at the TRACECA Summit in Baku for the “Restoration of
the Historic Silk Road, of which both Iran and Afghanistan were also signatories,
later in 2005, while Turkmenistan was a participant. In 2000, the TRACECA
Intergovernmental Commission was set up in Tbilisi. TRACECA has also been
dubbed as the renaissance of the Great Silk Road.11 Currently, besides new
infrastructural development, simultaneous rehabilitation of the existing roads,
railways, bridges and ports are in progress.
The next major initiative, which some observers have termed as the “Silk
Road of the 21st Century”, is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which
seeks to promote energy transport. This 1,768-km oil pipeline, transports one
million barrels of oil per day connecting Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli fields in the
Caspian Sea to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.12 The
pipeline runs through Azerbaijan (443 km), Georgia (249 km) and Turkey (1076
km).13 The building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline constituted a strategic
milestone in post-Soviet Eurasia.14
It is worthwhile to mention that the European Commission Strategy Paper
(1999), while specifying the common problems and challenges of Central Asia,
clearly spelt out the objectives of the European Union (EU) in supporting the
Central Asian Republics (CARs) and also making more sustainable use of the
natural resources including oil and natural gas of Central Asia.15 This resulted
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in the European countries taking a keen interest in the Multiple Pipeline Policy16
as the most important source of infrastructural development in this region. The
major objective of this policy was to provide alternative routes to export energy
resources, thereby diversifying the markets for their products.17
Initiatives by the US: The U.S.’s commitment to the restoration of the Silk
Route is enshrined in the U.S. Silk Road Strategy Acts of 1997, 1999 and 2006.
The year 2006 report was amended after the 9/11 terror attacks in the U.S. In
the earlier Silk Road Acts of 1997 and 1999, the US policy was to promote
friendly and economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia while
keeping intact their business interests in the region. Assisting in their
infrastructural development, transport, energy and trade in the East-West axis
were high on the US policy agenda.18 Congress findings also laid stress on the
creation of an open market in this region, which highlighted international private
investment, increased trade and commercial interactions with other parts of the
world.19 The US came out with the revised Silk Road Strategy Act of 2006,
which took into account the post 9/11 geo-political developments in these
regions, besides modifying the term ‘Central Asia and the South Caucasus’20
by incorporating Afghanistan.
Through its 2006 Silk Road Act, the U.S. articulated the need for
strengthening trade relations with energy-producing and energy-transporting
states in the region to provide its access to diversified energy resources, thereby
strengthening energy security not only for the U.S. but also for developed and
developing countries and to ensure future U.S. influence in Eurasia. The support
extended to TAPI also fits in to this U.S. objective. Senior Advisor in the State
Daniel Stein at the 7th Asian Gas Pipeline Summit held in New Delhi on 23
March 2012, thus stated: “TAPI has fitted well into the U.S. government’s
Eurasian energy policy meant to assist Europe and Asia in their quest for energy
security.”21
The U.S. has also supported or funded various infrastructural projects, be
it the TAR project or the TRACECA project, West European countries’ MPP or
even the TAPI gas pipeline, which clearly reiterates its strategy towards the
CARs; bolstering infrastructure development for the augmentation of private
investments across the globe and preventing any country from establishing a
monopoly over the energy resources and energy transport infrastructure in
Central Asia and South Caucasus, that may restrict its access and the access of
other countries to energy resources.22
Initiatives by China: The Chinese concept of the New Silk Road is clearly
different from the Western concept, which largely reflects its own historical
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linkages with Central and South Asia which takes into account the political and
economic dynamics in these regions. The Chinese have strategies in place to
rebuild this ancient artery,23 which connects China to Europe through the
Eurasian Land Bridge, across the Eurasian Continent. The UN engineered the
TAR agreement, but China has done more than any other nation to re-forge
trade and transport links and re-establish the Silk Route. Therefore, while in
2006 the U.S. introduced its Silk Road Strategy, it was in 2004 an issue of
China Daily mentioned China’s New Silk Road Strategy, through the Eurasian
Continental Bridge (Figure 2), linking continents through rail. Accordingly,
the new Eurasian Continental Bridge connects Lianyungang to the port of
Rotterdam in the Netherlands, while covering 4,131 km. The 2004 issue of
China Daily also speaks about newer approaches of forming the bridge, which
would be in the air, with the use of nine international flights in 44 airports in
this route.24
Source: Yunan Academy of Economics, “Third land link to Europe envisioned”, China
Daily, 02 July 2009.
Figure 2: Three Main Eurasian Land Bridges
The China Daily,25 in fact proposed three main corridors across the Eurasian
continent, serving three main arteries from which subsidiary rails, highways
and pipelines will be built. The first was based on the existing 13,000-km Trans-
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Siberian Railway route which connects Eastern Russia to Rotterdam, i.e. Trans-
Siberian Railway running from Vladivostok in Eastern Russia to Moscow and
connecting onto Western Europe and Rotterdam. The second route of 10,900-
km should start from Lianyungang port in Eastern China move through
Kazakhstan in Central Asia and end at Rotterdam, while the third proposed
route, which is 15,000-km would start from port cities in the Pearl River Delta,
including Shenzhen, travel west to Yunnan province, through Myanmar,
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, cross Europe and end at Rotterdam
in Netherlands, stretching through 17 countries.26
In 2011, China conducted a test run of the 2nd corridor of the Eurasian
Land Bridge. According to Shen Dingli, professor of International Studies at
the Shanghai-based Fudan University and Executive Dean of its Institute of
International Studies, “this bridge can help in breaking international and regional
logistics barriers, as the country’s Western regions would immensely benefit
from this new route.”27
The Belt and Road Initiative: The ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative was first
presented by Chinese President Xi Jinping in his keynote address at Kazakhstan’s
Nazarbayev University in the fall of 2013. The Belt and Road Initiative being
one of the top national strategic priorities of the Chinese government, is the
combination of the Silk Road Economic Belt, the overland route through Central
Asia to Europe and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road through South and
Southeast Asia to Middle East. Also, known as ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR)
(Figure 3), it has laid out priorities such as policy coordination, facilitating
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people
relations under its broad initiative.28
To finance this initiative, China has introduced two financial instruments
namely the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and $40 billion Silk
Road Fund which will facilitate laying the foundations of the new transport
infrastructure namely, roads, rail lines, pipelines, and ports.
Through this initiative, China wants to continue with its outbound
investments’ flows (outward FDI), but with a slight shift from the original
natural resources to high technology and consumption-oriented sectors as a
part of its economic transformation process. These efforts are also directed
towards diversifying their outbound investments which earlier was confined to
the natural resources and mining sectors only. Thus, the idea of OBOR is a
symbolic shift in China’s “going out” strategy while aligning with its efforts
towards economic transformation.
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Thus, the implementation of OBOR will not only help improve
infrastructure access and interconnectivity of neighbouring countries and regions
along these routes but will also bring new development opportunities for
outbound investments in three key sectors namely, infrastructure, energy and
advanced manufacturing.29
However, OBOR is not expected to change the core economic strategy of
China, whose primary goal is ultimately that of internal development. This has
been a hallmark of Deng Xiaoping’s era for the past three decades, wherein his
24-character guideline introduced in the early 1990s urges Chinese leaders to:
“observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our
Source: Chatham House
Figure 3: Belt and Road Initiative
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capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile, and never
claim leadership.”30 This is reflected well by the fact that all 31 Chinese provinces
have agreed to actively participate in the implementation of the OBOR strategy,
which will be connected to nearly two-thirds of the world’s population and
one-third of the global GDP.31
OBOR-Energy Linkage
As mentioned previously, energy is one of the key sector-seeking
investments and basis of cooperation through OBOR. While during the previous
Five Year Plans of China, starting from 10th Five Year Plan till the current 12th
Five Year Plan, developing of overseas oil and gas assets to ensure secure energy
supply has been encouraged under the ‘going out’ strategy; and the 13th Five
Year Plan draft seeks to promote energy cooperation in the frameworks of the
OBOR as well as active promotion of the construction of related energy channels
along the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridors and
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.32
This draft further carries forward its ‘Global Energy Governance’ strategy
highlighted in the 12th Five Year Plan to make full use of international
multilateral and bilateral energy cooperation mechanisms wherein there is
an increased communication and dialogue in the fields of energy security,
energy conservation, CO2 emissions mitigation, climate change, clean energy
development, etc.33
Thorsten Benner, Ricardo Soares, and Frederic Kalinke, in their chapter
“The Good/Bad Nexus in Global Energy Governance” written for a book titled,
The Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Games stated that,
Traditionally, Global Energy Governance has been dominated by crude
realpolitik concerns. For energy-importing governments in the industrialised
world only two variables mattered: the price and the security of supply of
the lifelines of industrial civilisation, especially oil. Likewise, oil-exporting
countries (which are mainly in the developing world) put a premium on
price as well as continuous and long-term rent generation through exports.
International energy companies were powerful intermediaries; they cared
about maximizing access to hydrocarbons and about their own profits.
International financial institutions, both private banks and public institutions
such as the World Bank, cared solely about a project’s narrow economic
viability when making investment decisions on the huge capital needs of
oil extraction ventures. The broader political, environmental, and
development impact on oil-rich countries was not a concern.34
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The current global energy system, which primarily lacks cohesion, is
practically invisible on the international stage, despite wide range of institutions
dealing with global energy economy and security.35 However, over the past
decades the situation has changed drastically and China is being regarded as a
leading global energy consumer and is now willing to embrace global energy
governance with a nuanced view on energy security. Chinese President Xi
Jinping,36 while emphasizing the need to plug global energy governance gap
announced a sweeping energy revolution in China dubbed as “Four Revolutions
and One Cooperation” vision. The four revolutions were centred on the four
areas of demand, production, technology and institution governance while
incorporating international energy cooperation.
According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) report, titled “China’s
engagement in global energy governance”, China, over the years, has established
bilateral energy cooperation dialogue mechanisms with nearly 30 partner
countries which are large in size like the U.S. and India, or rich in energy
resources, like Russia and Turkmenistan. It also engages with 20 multilateral
intergovernmental entities, which are of two types, namely, specialised, such
as IEF, IAEA, OPEC, IEA, etc. and comprehensive, such as G20, BRICS, SCO,
GCC, etc.
Notably, Chinese economy which remained nearly 10 per cent for almost
three decades in the past is now struggling to sustain at around 7 per cent
growth rate. One of the ideas behind launching of the OBOR is to also deal
with China’s slowing economic growth, wherein several institutions and
countries will have a role to play. Interestingly, most of the countries covered
under OBOR are developing countries which needs quality infrastructure and
large investments which would create an opportunity to help absorb China’s
massive excess industrial capacity.
China through its bilateral and multilateral outreach approach under
such mechanisms as mentioned above would try to deal with the fear of hard
landing, which persists at present.
Resetting of India-China Cooperation
The biggest question however remains as to whether OBOR will restructure
the way global trade is done, particularly after China’s initiative to work on
bridging the global governance gap. China wants to script the next growth wave
of Chinese exports through linking sectors like infrastructure, energy and
technology and going beyond its limited approach of acquiring oil and gas
assets across energy rich countries. China wants to optimise its outreach
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capabilities through several multilateral and bilateral means, with technology
and innovation playing one of the major roles.
The biggest challenge however continues to be about infrastructure and
funding bottlenecks which this ambitious project would like to deal with at the
earliest. Many of the developing countries and regions identified by China are
lacking both infrastructure and the funds to meet associated requirements and
it is highly possible that China’s mode of funding this project may not be
appreciated by the Central and Provincial governments of several countries.
The cooperative federalism could provide a solution to this concern, which
would itself take several years because the OBOR project is long term in nature,
with lots of political uncertainties.
Though, China’s introduction of funds through AIIB and BRICS New
Development Bank of $100 billion each and establishment of another $40 billion
Silk Road Infrastructure Fund could be used to finance OBOR, the political
consensus across the supply chains among all the stakeholders would be a
herculean task to achieve. As per McKinsey37 senior partners, Joe Ngai and
Kevin Sneader, investors would lay more emphasis on the transparency factors
with respect to clear returns on investments, an idea of appropriate public and
private funding, the way the money gets allocated and favourable regulatory
systems which works across borders.
The role of countries like India, which is one of the leading economies in
the world, would come handy. More transparency in OBOR projects can help
India and China to work closely both through bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms.
• Cooperation under SCO Platform
In the past, the SCO platform has been utilised by China to push its Silk
Road projects linked to infrastructural development. For instance, China is
already trying to implement the 3rd Eurasian Land Bridge, for a high-speed
network, which includes Iran, Pakistan and India.38 While the Keynote Speech
by Vice Foreign Minister, Cheng Guoping at the Lating Forum on 29 May
2012, clearly emphasized the relevance of the Silk Road, he also stated that the
SCO offers new opportunities for member states to renew their traditional
linkages, which had already been created between them because of the Silk
Road.39 With the withdrawal of western troops, China is gearing up for
post-2014 scenario where it sees the role of countries in Central Asia as an
important one. China might be willing to upgrade the SCO and other security
arrangements.40
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Importantly, the above proposition goes better when both India and Pakistan
become formal members of the SCO. Whole of SCO, including India, China
and Pakistan could then work in tandem to meet the stated and renewed
objectives of the SCO.
SCO Energy Charter is one such area where India can work closely with
China, taking forward the idea of the global energy governance and OBOR.
Given the vast energy resources in Central Asia, the SCO mooted the idea of
having an SCO Energy Club in 2006 to have deeper energy cooperation among
the member states. However, the ineffective mechanism of such an energy
cooperation with China as the dominant player, in the Central Asian energy
market, resulted in failing of the discussion and the club failed. This was largely
because China, being one of the largest energy consumer in the word was not
so interested in creating and developing a regional energy hub. It rather preferred
to acquire oil and gas assets to satiate its own energy demands. Entry of India
in the SCO can realise the objective of the SCO Energy Club within and beyond
the frontiers of Central Asia to connect this region to South and Southeast Asia
as well.
• Forming Quadrilateral with China, Pakistan and Iran
Thinking of a zero-sum game around the region of Iran will not be a good
idea at all. Instead, forming a quadrilateral of India, China, Pakistan and Iran to
develop ports of Chabahar and even Gwadar would be a better option. This can
happen only if each of these nations understand and respect the other’s position
and sentiments in the region. Both India and China have signed Chabahar Port
pact with Iran, which has invited other countries including Pakistan to be a part
of it.
Development of Chabahar and Gwadar port with the help of all the nations
combined will go a long way in successful implementation of China-Pakistan-
Economic Corridor (CPEC). India has serious reservations on CPEC, a flagship
project of OBOR. CPEC’s logistics projects are passing through large parts of
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir without its consultation. This was reflected in a
speech of Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar where he stated that,
The key issue is whether we will build our connectivity through consultative
processes or more unilateral decisions. Our preference is for the former
and the record bears this out quite clearly. Wherever that option is on the
table, as most recently it did in the AIIB, we have responded positively.
But we cannot be impervious to the reality that others may see connectivity
as an exercise in hard-wiring that influences choices.41
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Both China and Pakistan will do well to appreciate the responses and
concerns raised by India in taking forward their joint projects, which has both
regional and/or country specific impacts, rather than working unilaterally and
ignoring the sentiments of the key nations such as India.
In the past, India has been an integral part of that glorious ancient Silk
Road playing a critical and active role not only in facilitating trade but also for
the movement of culture and ideas.42 India would not mind to get itself further
integrated in the New Silk Road initiated under OBOR, provided it is more
transparent and appreciates the sentiments and concerns of the stakeholders
and partner countries, 65 in number, including those from land and sea routes,
connecting Asia, Africa and Europe.
Taking forward the initiative of OBOR, India would rather have a grand
strategy to even link International North South Trade Corridor and being a part
of Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement (APTTA). Indian External
Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj had expressed India’s desire to join APTTA at
the last Heart of Asia ministerial conference in Islamabad, which was taken
forward by Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani only to see it rejected by
Pakistani officials.43
Rather than any of these countries getting entangled into a zero-sum game
or having trust deficit, all the countries in question should join hands for
comprehensive development of the region, who will ultimately be the first
beneficiaries of the respective projects when integrated well rather than working
on it on an isolation basis. The Chabahar and Gwadar Port, for instance should
become complementary rather than competing ports, wherein Iran could be a
great enabler to bring together all the stakeholder countries such as India, China
and Pakistan together.44
In this regard India went a long way in reconnecting Pakistan but the latter’s
support for terrorism from Pakistan occupied Kashmir with tacit backing from
China didn’t go down well; and after the Uri attack, India had no option but to
react to surgical strikes in that region, which is very much a part of OBOR.
This has been a bone of contention for India; to or not to embrace OBOR
despite the visible benefits that the region can derive from implementation of
OBOR.
• Capitalising on the Past Gains
Notably, India is already a part of China’s 3rd Eurasian Land Bridge, for
high speeds network, which will connect other nations including Iran, Pakistan
and India. Interestingly, much of the network of the TAR project already exists
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as a part of the Eurasian Land Bridge, despite some gaps. It was in November
2006 when both China and India signed an agreement to restart this network
along the ancient Silk Routes, multilaterally with 20 other countries.45
The proceedings of the 4th India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue held
on 07 October 2016 46 have provided a ray of hope for reinvigorating ties between
India and China. Despite some rebuttal on the part of China on India’s
membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and Masood Azhar as a
terrorist, this dialogue helped both the countries to come closer on several issues
including agreeing on, to cooperate on sourcing energy from international
markets, cooperation on renewables, construction of high speed railways and
development of coastal manufacturing zones.
All these themes can be merged with global energy governance plans, while
bringing it into the ambit of OBOR, particularly with respect to energy and
infrastructure projects. In addition to having a greater confidence in bilateral
cooperative mechanism, India should explore the possibilities of new multilateral
mechanisms such as that of trilateral partnership with Nepal and China. Nepal,
which stood with India on terror and boycotted the SAARC Summit, has
proposed trilateral strategic cooperation and partnership with China and India.47
India, should delve further about such propositions which will go a long way to
provide a win-win scenario for the region.
Despite postponement of the SAARC Summit, India did well to offer a
helping hand to Pakistan in jointly fighting the menace of terror and showed a
great sense of maturity, signifying clearly that India is not against the people of
Pakistan but the terror which emanates from their soil.
All these efforts would propel greater strategic and economic cooperation
between India and China while restoring the trust which both the countries
have developed during the recent past due to several reasons. India and China
should therefore build up their level of confidence and restart from the bilateral
exchanges which have promised several gains for both the countries, as
highlighted by Prime Minister Modi’s visit to China in May 2016. While both
the countries could strive to achieve the target of $100 billion missed in 2015,
India could look forward to the ways and means of curbing the rising trade
deficit, which has crossed the record limit of $45 billion with China.
Conclusion
Therefore, both India and China can certainly change the rules of the game,
if they capitalize on the areas of convergence, particularly in the energy sector.
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The biggest advantage of cooperation in securing overseas energy assets would
be the relatively lower costs both countries would have to incur, (since
competition with each other would certainly shoot up the cost of acquiring
the assets) resulting in the optimisation of cost at the entire hydrocarbon
value chain. Both nations, which are also amongst the largest importers of
oil & gas from the Middle East, can possibly join hands in the lookout for
more hydrocarbons in Central Asia. Further, India can contribute significantly
towards the Silk Road initiatives provided China offers more transparency and
appreciates India’s concerns regarding terrorism, and also stops backing Pakistan
on the same. Joining hands on counter-terrorism mechanisms which go beyond
an agreement will help bridge the trust deficit gap between India and China,
which is a must to support several initiatives that both the countries have
envisioned jointly.
The multilateral platforms like SCO and BRICS can be tapped to its
maximum in reaping the benefits which can spread across member countries
and the region to which it connects giving a fillip to bilateral relationship.
The biggest advantage from synergies of India and China would be the
presence of two South Asian Giants in the Central Asian region with an objective
of promoting common goals, which will have the potential to connect regions
like South Asia and Southeast Asia, thereby bridging the global governance
gap.
These two nations would certainly help Eurasian countries in aiding
construction of relevant infrastructure which is in turn required to enhance
trade, commerce and business in general, bringing closer the energy rich
countries to market their produce to energy hungry nations like India and China.
This would certainly ease out the trade movements and energy flow in a most
optimum manner. The TAPI gas pipeline project is one such example, where
instead of looking at it as a zero-sum game and cornering the gas resources to a
single country, it should be facilitated with an objective of diversifying of the
resources from gas rich nations to energy hungry countries, using the SCO
Energy Club. This would facilitate equitable distribution of natural gas to the
entire region bringing down the cost of transport to a significant extent.
Thus the New Silk Road despite being the brainchild of any one country
should be opposed to the dominance of any one country. Thus both New Delhi
and Beijing should try to ensure that the New Silk Road moves along keeping
this spirit in mind and does not result in giving birth to rivalries and competition,
with no scope for a zero sum game.
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